Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
长春市户外广告设置管理办法
吉林省长春市人民政府
长春市人民政府令第22号
《长春市户外广告设置管理办法》业经2011年3月25日市政府第36次常务会议通过，现予发布，自2011年5月1日起施行。
市长：崔杰
二○一一年三月二十五日
长春市户外广告设置管理办法
第一条为了加强城市市容管理，规范户外广告的设置，保证城市市容整洁、美观、文明，根据法律、法规的有关规定，结合本市实际，制定本办法。
第二条凡在本市建成区内设置户外广告的单位和个人，均须遵守本办法。
第三条本办法所称户外广告设置是指直接或者间接介绍商品、服务或者发布公益性内容，依附户外的场地、空间、水面、建（构）筑物等设立户外广告设施的行为。
本办法所称的户外广告包括：
（一）利用建（构）筑物外部、道路两侧及空间、广场、公园、绿地、水面、堤防、临街庭院等设置的路牌、灯箱、霓虹灯、电子显示牌（屏）、实物造型、条幅、楼幔等形式的广告；
（二）利用市政公用、绿化、环卫、交通、水利、邮政、电信、电业、铁路等设施设置的广告；
（三）利用车辆、船只、飞行器、气球等悬挂、散发、喷绘的广告；
（四）利用工地、空地围挡设置的广告；
（五）利用其他形式在户外设置、悬挂、张贴、涂写、刻画、喷绘的广告。
第四条市市容主管部门负责户外广告设置的管理工作。
规划、建设、交通、房地、市政公用、园林、工信、公安等有关部门应当按照各自职责，依法做好户外广告设置管理的相关工作。
工商行政管理部门负责户外广告内容发布的审查和监督管理工作。
第五条市市容主管部门应当组织编制本市户外广告设置规划，报市人民政府批准后组织实施。
户外广告设置规划应当符合城市市容规划要求，与城市区域规划功能相适应，合理布局，分区控制。
第六条户外广告设置，应当符合下列规定：
（一）符合户外广告设置规划的要求；
（二）户外广告设施的设计风格、造型、色调、数量、体量、形式、位置、朝向、材质应当与周围环境相协调；
（三）夜景照明规划区域内设置户外广告设施应当安装夜景照明设施；
（四）符合公共安全要求。
第七条有下列情形之一的，不得设置户外广告设施：
(一)利用交通安全设施、交通标志设置；
(二)利用道路隔离带和道路两侧树木、草坪设置；
(三)在国家机关、医院、学校、文物保护单位和名胜风景点的建筑控制地带设置；
(四)影响市政公共设施使用，妨碍生产、生活，损害市容市貌或者在其他不宜设置户外广告设施的区域及载体上设置。
第八条 禁止设置下列户外广告设施：
（一）大型立柱式广告；
（二）楼顶广告；
（三）跨街广告；
（四）桥体广告；
（五）车体广告。
市区主要街路两侧禁止设置电子显示屏户外广告设施。
市区主要街路由市人民政府确定。
第九条设置户外广告设施应当向市市容主管部门提出申请，经批准后方可实施。
户外广告设置权可以通过招标、拍卖等方式投标竞买取
得。
第十条申请设置户外广告设施的，应当提交下列材料：
（一）申请书；
（二）平面位置图、现场实景图和景观效果图；
（三）工商营业执照；
（四）户外广告设置位置所有权或者使用权证明；
（五）设置大型户外广告设施的，还应当提交相应资质设计单位出具的施工图；
（六）安全保证书。
涉及消防安全的，须提交公安消防部门出具的许可证明；涉及利害关系人的，应当提交与利害关系人签订的同意设置户外广告设施的书面协议；利用建(构)筑物设置户外广告的，还应当提交房屋安全鉴定书。
第十一条市市容主管部门应当自受理申请之日起十五日内，对提供的材料进行审核并现场踏查。符合条件的，核发户外广告设置许可；不符合条件的，不予核发，告知申请人并书面说明理由。
通过投标竞买取得户外广告设置权的，按照有关规定办理。
第十二条户外广告设施的设置期限自批准之日起不超过两年；通过投标竞买取得户外广告设置权的，设置期限为三年。
第十三条任何单位和个人不得伪造、涂改、出租、出借、倒卖或者以其他形式非法转让户外广告设置许可。
第十四条户外广告设施应当按照批准的地点、时间、规格、施工图、效果图设置，不得擅自变更；确需变更的，应当到原批准机关办理变更手续。
第十五条户外广告设施应当自批准之日起六十日内设置完毕。未在规定的期间内设置完毕的，可在到期前申请延期。
未在规定的期间内设置完毕、未申请延期或者申请延期未获批准的，该项许可即行失效。
第十六条设置户外广告设施应当符合户外广告设施的安全技术标准，保证户外广告设施的安全和牢固。
第十七条户外广告设置单位或者个人应当负责户外广告设施的日常维护，并遵守下列规定：
（一）及时维修或者更新破损、倾斜、残缺的户外广告设施；及时清洗、油饰、粉刷出现污损、褪色的户外广告设施；
（二）定期进行安全检测，对存有安全隐患可能危及人身、财产安全的，应当及时修复或者拆除；
（三）户外广告照明设施应当保持其功能完好，霓虹灯、电子显示牌（屏）、灯箱应当保持画面显示完整，出现断亮、残损的，应当及时维护、更换，并在修复前停止使用。
第十八条在户外广告设置期限内，因城市规划调整或者社会公共利益需要，确需拆除户外广告设施的，依法对户外广告设置人给予补偿；拆除设置期满后经批准延期的户外广告设施，不予补偿。
设置人应当按照市容主管部门作出的决定要求，在限期内拆除。设置人拒不拆除的，市容主管部门代为拆除，所需费用由设置人承担。
第十九条户外广告设置期满后，户外广告设施应当予以拆除。需要延期设置的，设置人应当于期满前三十日内向原批准机关申请办理延期手续。
举办大型文化、体育、公益活动或者各类商品交易会、展销会等设置的户外广告设施，应当于活动结束后二日内予以撤除。
第二十条鼓励发布公益性广告。户外广告设施应当按照一定的比例发布公益性广告。
户外广告设施不得空置，无商业性广告时应当发布公益性广告。
举办各类会展活动需要临时使用户外广告设施的，应当按照使用的时间、版面给予设置人适当补偿。
第二十一条市容主管部门应当统一规划、合理布局，设置公益性广告和公共信息栏，并负责管理。
第二十二条 任何单位和个人不得擅自在建（构）筑物和其他设施上悬挂、刻画、涂写、喷绘、张贴非法宣传品。
第二十三条 任何单位和个人不得擅自在公共场所利用条幅、旗帜、气球、充气式装置、实物造型等载体形式设置户外广告宣传品。
第二十四条户外广告设置占道费按照价格部门规定的标准收取。户外广告设置占道费和招标、拍卖户外广告设置权所得费用应当在财政专户存储，专项用于城市市容建设。
第二十五条 违反本办法第九条第一款规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期拆除；逾期不拆除的，予以强制拆除，所需费用由责任人承担，并按照广告设置版面的总面积予以处罚：面积在十平方米以内的，处以二千元以上五千元以下罚款；面积超过十平方米(含十平方米)、不足五十平方米的，处以五千元以上一万元以下罚款；面积超过五十平方米(含五十平方米)的，处以一万元以上三万元以下罚款。
第二十六条 违反本办法第十三条规定的，由市容主管部门处以五千元以上一万元以下罚款，并撤销户外广告设置许可。
第二十七条 违反本办法第十四条规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期改正，可处以五百元以上五千元以下罚款；逾期未改正的，予以强制拆除。
第二十八条违反本办法第十七条规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期改正，可处以三百元以上一千元以下罚款。
第二十九条违反本办法第十九条规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期拆除或者撤除；逾期未拆除或者撤除的，由市容主管部门予以强制拆除或者撤除，并处以五百元以上五千元以下罚款。
第三十条违反本办法第二十二条规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期清除，并处以一千元以上三千元以下罚款。逾期未清除的，市容主管部门查实后，可书面通知有关通讯企业暂停其户外广告中标明的通讯号码的使用，有关通讯企业应当在接到通知之日起三日内配合执行。暂停通讯号码使用期间，户外广告设置人接受处理的，有关通讯企业应当根据市容主管部门的通知，恢复其通讯号码的使用。暂停及重新开通通讯号码所需费用由其设置人承担。
第三十一条违反本办法第二十三条规定的，由市容主管部门责令限期撤除，并处以五百元以上一千元以下罚款；逾期不撤除的，予以强制撤除，所需费用由责任人承担。
第三十二条户外广告设施发生倒塌、坠落等事故，造成他人人身伤害或者财产损失的，应当依法承担民事赔偿责任。
第三十三条 对妨碍市容主管部门执法人员执行公务的，由公安机关依法予以处罚；情节严重构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第三十四条市容主管部门工作人员在户外广告设置管理过程中，滥用职权、渎职失职、徇私舞弊的，依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第三十五条各县（市）户外广告设置的管理可参照本办法执行。
第三十六条本办法自2011年5月1日起施行。2002年10月9日公布施行的《长春市城市户外广告设置管理办法》同时废止。
